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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 41 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code Annotated 
§ 72-2-2. 
II. CERTIFIED QUESTION OF LAW 
The Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins has certified the following 
questions of law pursuant to Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appel-
late Procedure. 
1. What is the burden of proof necessary to establish waiver 
under Utah law? 
a. Is there one standard generally applicable to all situa-
tions involving waiver? 
b. Are there two different applicable standards depending 
on whether waiver is alleged from a party's action or conduct, or 
a party's inaction or silence? 
1. Where waiver is alleged from a party1s action or 
conduct, must the action or conduct of that party 
unequivocally show an intent to waive o£ at least be 
inconsistent with any other intent? 
2. Where waiver is alleged from a party's silence or 
failure to act, must the silence or failure to act on 
the part of that party be unequivocal and inconsistent 
with any other intent? 
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2. Were the jury instructions given in the instant case consis-
tent with Utah law on the law of waiver? 
3. Were the special interrogatories asked in the instant case 
consistent with Utah law on the law of waiver? 
III. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The case from which these questions of law arise was initi-
ated as a consolidated proceeding in the Third District Court, 
Summit County, State of Utah. Judge Ernest Baldwin was called 
out of retirement to preside over the jury trial in May 1988. At 
the close of evidence the jury was instructed and then asked to 
respond to 52 Special Interrogatories. Based on the jury's 
answers to these Special Interrogatories, Judge Baldwin entered 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, attached as Appendix A, 
and Order, Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, attached as 
Appendix B, both dated April 18, 1989. Immediately thereafter 
the parties filed numerous post-trial motions under Rules 50, 52, 
59 and 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but before these 
motions could be heard, one of the parties, Deseret Federal Sav-
ings & Loan Association, was placed into receivership under the 
direction of the Resolution Trust Corporation, which then removed 
the case to the United States District Court, District of Utah, 
Central Division, pursuant to Federal statute. 
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The post-trial motions filed in Judge Baldwin's court have 
not yet been decided and, in part, hinge on a determination of 
the questions of law set forth above. 
To set these questions of law in their proper factual con-
text, the following facts are provided: 
In 1983, Soters, Inc. ("Soters"), a Utah corporation, hired 
Tri-K Contractors ("Tri-K"), a Utah construction company, to 
build a condominium project at Summit Park, just off Interstate 
80 in Summit County, Utah. The construction project was ini-
tially financed by Zions Bank, however, it became necessary in 
the spring of 1984, after construction was underway, to refinance 
the construction loan. Pre-Trial Order at 14. 
Soters approached Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Association 
("Deseret Federal") which agreed to provide a construction loan 
that would pay off the earlier Zions loan and provide funds for 
completion. Before Deseret Federal would make the loan it 
required certain things of Soters and Soter's contractor Tri-K in 
addition to the customary loan agreement, promissory note and 
trust deeds between Soters and Deseret Federal. Of material 
interest to the questions presented here, Deseret Federal 
required Soters to execute a formal written construction agree-
ment with Tri-K. Testimony of Tri-K's attorney, Stanley Stoll, 
RT 159:19-161:6, 5/12/88. Even though the project was underway, 
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no formal typed construction contract with a firm completion date 
had yet been signed. Stoll, RT 156:3-6, 5/12/88. Deseret Fed-
eral also required Tri-K to obtain a performance bond naming 
Soters and Deseret Federal as dual obligees. Testimony of Ronald 
Frandsen, RT 128:8-14, 5/19/88. 
On or about April 4, 1984, Soters and Tri-K entered into an 
AIA Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor 
("Construction Agreement) in which Tri-K agreed to construct the 
condominiums for approximately $2.8 million.- One of Tri-Kfs 
principals, Sherwin Knudsen, had attorney Stanley Stoll prepare 
the standard form Construction Agreement typing in a firm project 
completion date of December 31, 1984. Stoll, RT 152:13-158:14, 
5/12/88. Knudsen then presented the Construction Agreement to 
its surety, United Pacific Insurance Company, which issued a per-
formance bond on April 4, 1984, naming Soters and Deseret Federal 
as dual obligees. Pre-Trial Order at 15. Soters assigned the 
Deseret Federal agreed to loan $3 million under a separate 
Construction Loan Agreement with Soters. From the loan pro-
ceeds $2,554,850 was to be used for construction costs, 
including pay-off of existing indebtedness to Zions. The 
difference between the $2.8 million in the Soters/Tri-K Con-
struction Agreement and the $2.55 million devoted to con-
struction costs in the Construction Loan Agreement repre-
sented Tri-K's profit which it agreed to take out of any 
proceeds from the eventual sale of the condominiums. Find-
ings of Fact at 15, reproduced as Appendix "A". 
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Construction Agreement to Deseret Federal as additional security 
for the loan. 
On December 31, 1984, the project was not substantially com-
pleted as required under the terms of Tri-K's Construction Agree-
ment. Findings of Fact 11 52. An architect's report introduced 
at trial estimated that the project was only 55% completed. One 
of the many issues at trial was whether Tri-K had breached its 
Construction Agreement by failing to complete the project by the 
contract completion date and whether Soters or Deseret Federal 
had waived or extended the date. The waiver defense of Tri-K and 
United Pacific centered around the interpretation of certain 
events that transpired in the early months of 1985. 
Deseret Federal had participated the construction loan with 
Continental Federal Savings Bank in Virginia. Continental had 
been claiming throughout the latter part of 1984 that the loan 
was out of balance; that is, the balance of undisbursed loan pro-
ceeds was calculated to be insufficient to complete the project. 
By the end of 1984, Deseret Federal reached the same conclusion 
and so notified its borrower Soters that because the loan was out 
of balance no more funds would be disbursed. On January 11, 
1985, Tri-K submitted its draw request for the work it had com-
pleted in December 1984. Deseret Federal paid this draw on Feb-
ruary 7, 1985, but thereafter made no further disbursements from 
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the construction loan. Findings of Fact H41; Pre-Trial Order at 
14-15. 
During the first months of 1985, several meetings were held 
in Salt Lake City to find a solution to the problems that had 
arisen because Tri-K had not completed the project on time and 
the loan was out of balance. In attendance were Sherwin Knudsen 
of Tri-K, Greg Soter, of Soters, Inc., Soter's attorney, Stanley 
Stoll, Deseret Federal's attorney, David Redd, and two represen-
tatives of Deseret Federal, Ron Frandsen, Major Loan Department 
Manager, and Steven Anderson, the head of Deseret Federal's 
appraisal and construction lending departments. Both Stoll and 
Redd testified at trial that during these meetings, Deseret Fed-
eral presented Greg Soter with an ultimatum that unless Soters 
brought the loan back into balance by contributing its own funds 
to make up the shortfall, Deseret Federal would not make any fur-
ther disbursements. Sherwin Knudsen acknowledged that he was 
aware of Deseret Federal's position as a result of these meet-
ings. Knudsen was also confronted with the fact that the project 
had not been completed by December 31st. Ron Frandsen expressed 
concern in one of these meetings that Tri-K had not completed the 
project in time for marketing the condominiums during the '84-'85 
ski season. Knudsen estimated that he believed the project could 
still be completed within budget, but could not be completed 
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until the fall of 1985. Testimony of Ron Frandsen, RT 
156:10-159:17, 5/19/88; Testimony of Stanley Stoll, RT 
25:20 34:22, 5/12/88; Testimony of Sherwin Knudsen, RT 77, 
5/16/88. 
There was no evidence presented at trial that anyone from 
Deseret Federal or Soters ever told Tri-K in any of these meet-
ings, or at any other time, that it was in breach of its Con-
struction Agreement for failure to complete the project by Decem-
ber 31, 1984. There was also no evidence that anyone from 
Deseret Federal or Soters ever told Tri-K that it was not 
expected to adhere to its contractual completion date, or that 
Deseret Federal or Soter's was expressly waiving its right under 
the Construction Agreement to have the project completed by 
December 31, 1984. 
During January through about mid April 1985, while these 
meetings were taking place, Tri-K remained on the job and submit-
ted monthly draw requests to Deseret Federal which were never 
paid. In April, Tri-K walked off the job and subsequently filed 
a mechanics1 lien against the property. In June 1985, Deseret 
Federal gave written notice to Tri-K's surety, United Pacific, 
that Tri-K had not completed the project on time and was in 
breach. United Pacific never responded in any fashion to Deseret 
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Federal's notice. Testimony of Ron Frandsen, RT 160:8-161:6, 
5/19/88. 
One of the issues sent to the jury was whether Deseret Fed-
eral had waived Tri-K's December 31, 1984 completion date, thus 
relieving both Tri-K and United Pacific of any liability. 
At trial the jury was first instructed on the law of waiver 
by Instruction No. 18 which read: 
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a 
known right. To constitute a waiver, there must be an 
existing right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of 
its existence, and an intention to relinquish it. To 
constitute waiver, one's actions or conduct must be 
distinctly made, must clearly display in some unequivo-
cal manner any intent to waive, and must be inconsis-
tent with any other intent. 
Neither Tri-K nor United Pacific's attorneys objected to the 
instruction. RT 20-23, Objections to Jury Interrogatories and 
Special Verdict, 5/26/88. 
The issue of Deseret Federal's waiver of the December 31, 
1984 completion date was then submitted to the jury by special 
interrogatories. Special Interrogatories 22-24, patterned after 
the language in Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983), 
sought to determine whether Tri-K had met its burden of proving 
waiver and read as follows: 
22. Has Tri-K established by a preponderance of 
the evidence that Deseret Federal acted in such a man-
ner as to distinctly relinquish the right under the 
Construction Contract to have the Camelot Condominium 
Project completed on or before December 31, 1984? 
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X Yes No 
23. Has Tri-K established by a preponderance of 
the evidence that Deseret Federal clearly displayed in 
some unequivocal manner an intent to relinquish the 
right under the Construction Contract to have the 
Camelot Condominium Project completed on or before 
December 31, 1984? 
X Yes No 
24. Has Tri-K established by a preponderance of 
the evidence that any evidence of an intent by Deseret 
Federal to relinquish the right under the Construction 
Contract to have the Camelot Condominium Project com-
pleted on or before December 31, 1984, was inconsistent 
with any other intent? 
Yes X No 
Because the jury answered "No" to no. 24, Judge Baldwin con-
cluded that Tri-K had not met its burden. Consequently, judgment 
was made in favor of Deseret Federal and against Tri-K and United 
Pacific, jointly and severally, in an amount equivalent to the 
costs to complete the project. Findings of Fact No. 54, 56 at 
15-16. Judgment 11 7 at 5. 
Tri-K did not contend that it was entitled to payment for 
its January-April 1985, work by virtue of its Construction Agree-
ment. Rather, it claimed that Deseret Federal, by its represen-
tations to Sherwin Knudsen, fraudulently induced Tri-K to stay on 
the project from January-April 1985, knowing that Tri-K would not 
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be paid.- United Pacific and Tri-K have argued in support of 
their post-trial motions that this fraud was the "other intent" 
that the jury was referring to when it answered "No" to Special 
Interrogatory No. 24 ("inconsistent with any other intent than an 
intent to waive") and that an intention to commit fraud does not 
mutually exclude an intent to waive the completion date. More-
over, United Pacific and Tri-K contend that Jury Instruction No. 
18 and Special Interrogatory 24 misstated the law by requiring 
the jury to find that Deseret Federal's conduct purportedly man-
ifesting waiver was inconsistent with any other intent. 
Deseret Federal, on the other hand, contends that the jury 
understood and believed that Deseret Federal intended to hold 
Tri-K liable for its prior breach but that the meetings involving 
Greg Soter and Sherwin Knudsen subsequent to the December 1985, 
completion date were an attempt to mitigate all of the problems 
associated with the project before resorting to litigation, and 
that Deseret Federal's encouragement to Greg Soter and Knudsen 
during those meetings, not to abandon the project, was consistent 
1/ The jury found for Tri-K on its fraudulent inducement claim, 
but Judge Baldwin took this issue from the jury on the basis 
that there was insufficient evidence to support a fraud 
claim. Judge Baldwin did, however, conclude that Deseret 
Federal had promised to pay Tri-K for the work it performed 
in January-April 1985, and was estopped to deny its obliga-
tion. Findings of Fact No. 58 at 16. 
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with an intent to keep the project afloat in the event the prob-
lems could be resolved, and to mitigate its damages, and not a 
manifestation of an intention to relinquish its right to a Decem-
ber 31, 1984 completion date, Deseret Federal also argues that 
Judge Baldwin, having heard all of the evidence, including the 
testimony concerning Deseret Federal's dealings with Tri-K during 
the January through April period, recognized the jury's position 
on the waiver issue, and found the jury's answer to Special 
Interrogatory No. 24 consistent with the evidence, and that he 
entered his conclusion of law accordingly. See Findings of Fact 
nos. 54, 61; Conclusion of Law no. 30. 
In spite of the fact that neither United Pacific, nor Tri-K 
objected at trial to Jury Instruction No. 18, or to any of the 
special interrogatories, they have based their post-trial motions 
under Rules 50, 52, 59, and 60, on the grounds that this jury 
instruction and special interrogatory misstated the law. 
Although the jury instruction and interrogatories were patterned 
after the language in Hunter v. Hunter, United Pacific and Tri-K 
assert that Hunter has been overruled and that Tri-K should not 
have been required to prove that Deseret Federal's conduct was 
inconsistent with an intent other than an intent to relinquish 
its right to have the project completed by December 31, 1984. 
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They argue that Tri-K, having proven that Deseret Federals con-
duct was distinct and unequivocal, has met its burden. 
These questions of law have been certified by Judge Jenkins 
because it is not clear to him what must be proved in order to 
find a waiver. In its post-trial motions United Pacific has 
argued that the "inconsistent with any other intent" language in 
special interrogatory no. 24, although patterned after Hunter v. 
Hunter, is superfluous and not required under Utah law. See 
United Pacific's Memorandum in Support of Post-Trial Motions; 
Memorandum of Deseret Federal in Opposition to Post-Trial Motions 
of United Pacific and Sherwin Knudsen. United Pacific has 
repeatedly pointed to decisions of the Utah Court of Appeals 
decided after Hunter to support its contention that Hunter has 
been overruled. Some of these cases state that the party's 
action or conduct must unequivocally evince an intent to waive ox 
must at least be inconsistent with any other intent. See Barnes 
v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); B. R. Woodward 
Marketing, Inc. v. Collins Food Service, Inc., 754 P.2d 99, 101 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); but. see Webb v. ROA General, Inc., 804 P.2d 
547 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (intent to waive must be shown by con-
duct which is unequivocal and which is inconsistent with any 
other intent). 
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There is no decision from this Court which overrules Hunter, 
In fact, all of the decisions of this Court support Hunter and 
can be reconciled with it. Moreover, no Utah Court of Appeals 
case cites Hunter with disapproval. However, several Court of 
Appeals, decisions starting with Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 
1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), have failed to apply the full Hunter 
standard. These decisions appear to alternately mix two separate 
concepts dealing with the intent of the waiving party, leading to 
the and/or language preceeding the requirement that conduct be 
"inconsistent with any other intent". 
IV. ELEMENTS OF WAIVER ARE ESTABLISHED 
BY ONE OP THREE STANDARDS 
In answer to Judge Jenkins1 initial questions, evidence of 
waiver generally takes three forms. However, the distinction 
does not run along the lines of action and conduct versus silence 
or inaction. Rather, the standard is determined by the nature of 
the relinquishment, that is, whether it is express or implied, or 
based on conduct amounting to an estoppel. 
Where the relinquishment of a known right is expressly made, 
the relinquishment must be distinct. 
Where the relinquishment of a known right is implied from 
some positive act, or by positive inaction, the relinquishment 
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must be distinct, it must be manifested in some unequivocal man-
ner, and it must be inconsistent with any other intent. 
The relinquishment of a known right may also be implied by 
conduct so inconsistent with the intent to enforce the right as 
to induce a reasonable belief that it has been relinquished. 
The intentional relinquishment (actual or constructive) of a 
known right may be implied from silence where there is knowledge 
of the right and a positive duty to speak. Mere silence, how-
ever, absent such a duty can never constitute an intentional 
relinquishment of a known right. 
The special interrogatories nos. 22-24 and jury instruction 
no. 18 in this case, unobjected to by Tri-K and United Pacific, 
and patterned after Hunter v. Hunter, accurately stated the Utah 
law at the time of trial as it applied to the facts and circum-
stances in this case. 
A. Definition of Waiver 
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known 
right. The relinquishment must be distinctly made, although it 
may be express or implied. Phoenix Ins. Co. v.. Heath, 90 Utah 
187, 61 P.2d 308, 310 (1936); 92 C.J.S. Waiver at 1041; 28 
Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver § 154 (1966). 
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B. Express Waiver 
Waiver may be expressed formally by words or declarations, 
and may arise as the result of an express agreement. The 
requirement for express waiver is that the relinquishment of a 
right must be distinctly made. 92 C.J.S. Waiver at 1062. It is 
not necessary that there must be unequivocal acts or conduct 
evincing an intent to waive. This seems to be implicit where the 
express waiver is distinct. See Rees v. Intermountain Health 
Care, 808 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1991); Wagner v. Wagner, 621 P.2d 1279, 
1284 (Wash. 1980); Bartleman v. Humphrey, 441 S.W.2d 335, 343 
(Mo. 1969). None of the decisions of this Court cited in Judge 
Jenkins1 certification order refers to express waiver. Like the 
present case they are all implied waiver cases. 
C. Implied Waiver 
Waiver may be implied from conduct or inaction. In either 
event the relinquishment must be intentional and it must relate 
to a known right. Waiver rests and depends solely on the inten-
tion of the party against whom it is asserted. 92 C.J.S. Waiver 
at 1058. The relinquishment of a known right may be implied from 
conduct or inaction where there is an actual intent to relinquish 
the right; and, it may be implied from such conduct or inaction 
where there is not an actual intent to relinquish but where the 
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waiving party so acted as to mislead the other, which warrants an 
inference of the relinquishment of a known right. id. at 1060. 
1. Actual Intent 
Because intentional relinquishment lies at the founda-
tion of waiver, the party asserting the relinquishment must prove 
intent on the part of the party holding the right. I_d. at 1058. 
While it may be said that "the question whether waiver will be 
found in any particular case depends not upon the secret inten-
tion of the party against whom it is asserted, but upon the 
effect which his conduct has upon the other party," B. R. 
Woodward Marketing v. Collins Food, 954 P.2d at 103 (citing 28 
Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver S 158 at 843 (1966)), there is no 
waiver unless the waiver is so intended by one party and so 
understood and accepted by the other. 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and 
Waiver § 158 at 843. 
A party asserting a waiver implied from the conduct or inac-
tion of the other party holding the right must prove that the 
party holding the right actually intended to relinquish it, and 
must prove that the relinquishment was manifested in some 
unequivocal manner, by some distinct positive act, or by positive 
inaction, which is inconsistent with the continued assertion of 
the right. 92 C.J.S. Waiver at 1063, 1064; Goqlia v. Bodnar, 749 
P.2d 9221, 928 (Ariz. App. 1987); American Continental Life Ins. 
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Co. v. Ranier Construction Co,, Inc., 607 P.2d 372, 374 (Az. 
1980); Howard J. White, Inc. v. Varian Associates, 2 Cal.Rptr. 
871, 875 (Cal. App. 1960); Bartleman v. Humphrey, 441 S.W.2d 335, 
343 (Mo. ISM);-' Bowman v. Webster, 269 P.2d 960, 961 (Wash. 
1954). Simply stated, where waiver is implied, the conduct or 
evidence of waiver must be distinct, unequivocal, and inconsis-
tent with any other intent. Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430 (Utah 
1983). 
2. Constructive Intent 
In some circumstances, waiver may occur in the absence 
of an actual intention to relinquish a right. A relinquishment 
of a known right may be manifested by conduct of the party 
knowingly possessing the right, which conduct is of such a nature 
as to mislead the opposite party into an honest belief that the 
waiver was intended or assented to. This conduct or action must 
at least be inconsistent with any other intention than an 
intention to relinquish that right. In this sense the intent is 
constructive rather than actual. 92 C.J.S. at 1060; see Seaport 
Citizens Bank v. Dippel, 735 P.2d 1047 (Idaho App. 1987); 
"If [waiver] not shown by express declarations but implied 
by conduct, there must be a clear, unequivocal, and decisive 
act of party showing such purpose, and so consistent with 
intention to waive that no other reasonable explanation is 
possible" 441 S.W.2d at 343. 
-17-
Wells v. Minor, 578 N.E.2d 1337, 1346 (111. App. 1991); Mahban v. 
MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 691 P.2d 421, 424 (Nev. 1984); Rubin v. 
Los Angeles Federal Savings & Loan, 205 Cal. Rptr. 455, 459 (Cal. 
App. 4 Dist. 1984); Alford, Meroney & Company v. Rowe, 619 S.W.2d 
210, 213 (Tex. App, 1981); Scott v. Federal Life Insurance 
Company, 19 Cal.Rpt. 258, 262 (Cal. App. 1962); Beck v. Lind, 235 
N.W.2d 239, 251 (N.D. 1975); Perlick v. Country Mutual Casualty 
Co., 80 N.W.2d 921 (Wise. 1957).-7 
D. Evidence of Waiver by Silence is the 
Same as Other Implied Waiver 
A waiver may be implied from the silence of the party who 
has the power of waiving under circumstances which require him to 
speak, but mere silence is not waiver unless there is some duty 
or obligation to speak. Plateau Mining Company v. Utah Div. of 
State Lands, 802 P.2d 720, 730 (Utah 1990) (citing Dalton v. 
LeBlanc, 350 F.2d 95, 98-99 (10th Cir. 1965); 92 C.J.S. Waiver at 
1064; s^e also Stewart v. Casey, 595 P.2d 1176 (Mont. 1979); 
1/ Many of these cases define waiver as "The intentional relin-
quishment of a known right, or conduct so inconsistent with 
the intent to enforce the right as to induce a reasonable 
belief that it has been relinquished". While this defini-
tion points to the fact that in some circumstances the 
intent is constructive rather than actual it does little to 
instruct the reader on the evidence required to prove the 
actual intentional relinquishment where it is implied from 
conduct rather than express waiver. See Alford, Meroney & 
Company v. Rowe, 619 S.W.2d at 213 for one court's attempt 
to define the form of evidence to fit this definition. 
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decided. Additionally, on appeal Intermountain Health Care 
offered an erroneous concession that express waiver requires 
unequivocal conduct which is inconsistent with any other intent, 
a definition which it apparently derived from implied waiver 
cases decided by the Utah Court of Appeals. The only shortcoming 
in the decisions from this Court dealing with waiver has been a 
failure to explain what in some cases was obvious; that the pur-
ported relinquishment of the right in each case was implied from 
the party's conduct or silence, where it was claimed by the party 
asserting a waiver that the relinquishing party actually intended 
to relinquish his or her rights. 
The recent decisions of the Utah Court of Appeals have been 
much less consistent on these issues. While none of these opin-
ions has referred to Hunter with disfavor, these decisions build 
on previous decisions of the Court of Appeals rather than the 
decisions of this Court, resulting in the promulgation of mixed 
and alternating statements of the evidence necessary to prove 
that the party holding the right intentionally relinquished it. 
These cases have led to the conjunctive/disjunctive problem in 
reference to the "inconsistent with any other intent" prong, that 
United Pacific points to as overruling Hunter. 
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ex-husband claimed that the woman impliedly waived her right to 
enforce the order. The Utah Supreme Court held that the woman 
did not waive her right to enforce the child support order. 
In so holding, the Hunter court stated: 
With respect to waiver, this Court has previously 
stated that: 
'A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known 
right. To constitute a waiver, there must be an exist-
ing right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its 
existence, and an intention to relinquish it. It must 
be distinctly made, although it may be express or 
implied.f 
American Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Blomquist, 21 Utah 2d 
289, 292, 445 P.2d 1, 3 (1968) (quoting Phoenix Insur-
ance Co. v. Heathf 90 Utah 187, 194, 61 P.2d 308, 
311-12 (1936)). To constitute waiver, one's actions or 
conduct must be distinctly made, must evince in some 
unequivocal manner an intent to waive, and must be 
inconsistent with any other intent. See id. See also, 
e.g. , Waterway Terminals Co. v. P.S. Lord Mechanical 
Contractors, 242 Or. 1, 406 P.2d 556 (1965); Wagner v. 
Wagner, 95 Wash. 2d 94, 621 P.2d 1279 (1980). 
The doctrine of estoppel is a different principle than, 
and must be distinguished from, the legal doctrine of 
waiver. As noted above, waiver is the voluntary, 
intentional relinquishment of a known right. 
Hunter, 669 P.2d at 432. 
The attorneys in the Soters' litigation patterned Jury 
Instruction No. 18 and Special Interrogatories Nos. 22-24 after 
the above-quoted language. Hunter did not overrule Phoenix or 
Blomquist. It cited those cases with approval and quoted the 
black letter definition for waiver as set forth in them. The 
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right, it is necessary that tue person against whom a 
waiver is claimed have intended to relinquish the 
right, advantage, or benefit and his action must be 
inconsistent with any other intent than an intent to 
waive it. Further, to constitute a waiver, other than 
by express agreement, there must be unequivocal acts or 
conduct evincing an intent to waive. (citation omit 
ted). Intent cannot be inferred from doubtful or 
ambiguous factors. 
Chevrolet v. Rutz, 808 r. , u . t • *.i -> : . - O 
(using the Wagner language), 
I lui i t e r : i id i io t :::I iai: ige 11 Ie PI loei i i x Li isurai ice and Blomq u i s t 
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right. The court apparently felt such an explanation was unnec-
essary in Phoenix and Blomquist where, through no tortuous pro-
cess could the conduct be construed as a manifestation of waiver. 
Blomquist, 445 P.2d at 3. 
B. Supreme Court Developments Since Hunter Remain 
Consistent 
Shortly after Hunter, this Court decided two other waiver 
cases. Anqelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772, 
776-77 (Utah 1983) (handed down one month after Hunter), cited 
Hunter for the same language ("to constitute waiver, one's 
actions or conduct must be distinctly made, must evince in some 
unequivocal manner an intent to waive, and must be inconsistent 
with any other intent"). Parks v. Zions First National Bank, 673 
P.2d 590 (Utah 1983) used only the definition of waiver from 
Blomquist. The court found that the plaintiff had not at any 
time intentionally and distinctly relinquished his claim of own-
ership against the property. Id. at 605. 
In Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium Company, 704 P.2d 573 
(Utah 1985), the plaintiff sued the defendant for intentionally 
interfering with plaintiffs1 right-of-way to water in an irriga-
tion ditch. As a fall back position the defendant asserted 
waiver claiming that the plaintiff, after complaining for more 
than a year, and thereafter allowing the defendant to put in a 
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six-inch pip'1, waived his rig! it to wat-
tion. This fourt, citing Hunter w.i apwruva. ./aii-j: 
A tindii ig of waiver requires ti lat t! le conduct of the 
actor demonstrate an intentional relinquishment of a 
known right. See, e^g^, Hunter v. Hunter, Utah, 669 
P.2d 430, 432 (1983)." On the facts presented, Earl 
Morgan's actions could as easily have been motivated by 
a desire to get water to the south end of the Morgan 
property. 
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whether the State waived its right to the alternative royalty 
provision, the Court said: 
[W]e state the law here for guidance to the trial court 
in deciding this issue on remand. "A waiver is the 
intentional relinquishment of a known right.ff American 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Blomquist, 21 Utah 289, 292, 445 
P.2d 1, 3 (1968) (quoting Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Heath, 90 
Utah 187, 194, 61 P.2d 308, 311 (1936)). Mere silence 
is not a waiver unless there is some duty or obligation 
to speak. Dalton v. Le Blanc, 350 F.2d 95, 98-99 (10th 
Cir. 1965). 
Id. at 730. Perhaps it would have assisted the trial court to 
have mentioned that the State's silence must also be inconsistent 
with any other intent, but there is no indication from the deci-
sion that this Court intended to exclude that element from the 
trial court's eventual finding. 
Recently this Court decided Rees v. Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1991). The plaintiff, Dr. Rees, 
was called before a review committee at Intermountain Health 
Care's McKay Dee Hospital in Ogden, where he was confronted with 
the high mortality rate occurring in his cardiac patients. Dr. 
Rees was presented with the alternative of voluntarily placing a 
moratorium on his elective surgeries, and working as an assistant 
to another surgeon, or undergoing due process which he was told 
would result in a formal revocation of his hospital privileges. 
Dr. Rees remained silent at the meeting and was apparently sur-
prised several days later when he received a letter from one of 
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Luc circumstances surrounding the alleged waive 
To prove a wai /ei: , it must be shown tnat tne pa. 
had knowledge of his rights and did something design-
ed 1.y or knowing 1 y to re 1 inquish them, 
A w a i v e r in ay be proved b y i n d i r e c t evidence. . 
Silence, or failure to act under some circumstances may 
be sufficient to prove waiver where such silence or 
failure to act is ui iequivoca1 and i i Iconsistent with ai iy 
o t h e r ii i tei it , 
A w a i , e r m a y b e i r i f e r r e d f r o m a p a r t y' s a c k n o w 1 -
edgment of his rights and his subsequent course of con-
duct. You may look at the totality of the circum-
stances , including the backgroi ind experience and con -
duct of the party to determine if he made a voli intary 
waiver of a right. 
These statements proceeded from Dr. Rees1 requested instruc-
tions based on the Utah Court of Appeals holding in Clark v. 
American Concept Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah App. 1988), 
and B. R. Woodward Marketing Inc. v. Collins Food Service, Inc., 
754 P.2d 99, 101 (Utah App. 1988). Intermountain Health Care 
Appellant's Brief at 15, Docket No. 890170; Rees at 1074. Both 
of these Court of Appeals decisions like the Rees case itself, 
dealt with implied waiver, not express waiver. The jury thereaf-
ter answered two special interrogatories. The first simply asked 
whether Dr. Rees had waived his rights to due process and to vol-
untarily give up his surgery privileges. The second, asked the 
jury to state Dr. Rees1 damages. Intermountain Health Care 
Appellant's Brief at 4. 
Intermountain Health Care took the position on appeal that 
where Dr. Rees1 conduct was silence, and the relinquishment was 
to be implied therefrom, that requiring a finding that his con-
duct was "unequivocal and inconsistent with any other intent" 
unnecessarily embellished the standard of proof expressed in 
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Heath, 61 P.2d 308 (Utah 1936), and American 
Savings & Loan Association v. Blomquist, 445 P.2d 1 (Utah 1968). 
Intermountain Health Care Appellant's Brief at 15-16. 
In Rees this court held that the standard of proof in 
Blomquist and Phoenix Ins. Co., requiring that waiver "be 
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In spite of the detour caused by the parties reliance on the 
Court of Appeals' decisions, the Rees decision properly put the 
law in this area back on its proper course and held, once again 
consistent with Hunter, that in circumstances involving implied 
waiver, whether the conduct is action or silence, it must be dis-
tinct, unequivocal and inconsistent with any other intent. 
1. The Standard for Evidence of Implied Waiver in the 
Decisions of the Court of Appeals Fails to Recog-
nize that Waiver Rests Solely on the Intention of 
the Party Holding the Right, 
In Rees , jury instruction No. 9 patterned after the language 
in B.R. Woodward Marketing v. Collins Food, Inc., 754 P.2d at 
101, stated "The action . . . [constituting the relinquishment] 
must unequivocally show an intent to waive or must at least be 
inconsistent with any other intent." 
This instruction was not a correct statement of the law. It 
mixed the concept of implied waiver and actual intent with the 
concept of constructive intent based on conduct which is of such 
a nature as to mislead the other person into believing that the 
waiver was intended or assented to. This mistake was predicated 
on a single sentence from 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver § 158 
at 843 stating: 
As in other situations, the question whether 
waiver will be found in any particular case 
depends not upon the secret intention of the 
party against whom is is asserted, but upon the 
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party. 
See B. R. Woodward, /5 1 P. 2d at 103. 
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i n A * i.i . 
There is no waiver unless the waiver is so 
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THE JURY INSTRUCTION AND SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES IN 
THIS CASE ACCURATELY STATED UTAH LAW AS IT EXISTED AT 
THE TIME OF TRIAL 
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never been overruled. Moreover, the instruction and 
interrogatories represented an accurate statement of the law 
insofar as it related to implied waiver based upon actual intent 
to relinquish a known right. In view of each of the cases deal-
ing with waiver decided by this Court subsequent to Hunter, they 
remain a correct statement of the law. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In summary, there is not a single standard generally appli-
cable to all situations involving waiver. However, the distinc-
tion does not run along the lines of action and conduct versus 
silence or inaction. Rather, the standard is determined by the 
nature of the relinquishment, that is, whether it is express or 
implied, or based on conduct amounting to an estoppel. 
Where the relinquishment of a known right is expressly made, 
the relinquishment must be distinct. 
Where the relinquishment of a known right is implied from 
some positive act, or by positive inaction, the relinquishment 
must be distinct, it must be manifested in some unequivocal man-
ner, and it must be inconsistent with any other intent. 
The relinquishment of a known right may also be implied by 
conduct so inconsistent with the intent to enforce the right as 
to induce a reasonable belief that it has been relinquished. 
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APPENDIX 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SOTER'S INC., et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al., 
Defendants, 
SHERWIN KNUDSEN d/b/a ] 
TRI-K GENERAL CONTRACTORS, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ; 
SOTER'S, INC., et al. i 
Defendants. ] 
| FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
I CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 Civil No. 8560 
1 (Judge Ernest Baldwin) 
Case No. 8561 
(Consolidated) 
This case came on for hearing before the above-entitled Court 
sitting with a jury on May 11, 1988. Evidence in the case was 
closed on May 20, 1988 and the Court heard argument on Motions for 
Directed Verdict on May 23 and 24, 1988. In response to said 
Motions, the Court dismissed all affirmative claims for damages of 
Soter's, Inc. and Sherwin Knudsen d/b/a Tri-K Contractors ("Tri-
K") against Continental Federal Savings Bank ("Continental"). Upon 
stipulation, the Court also dismissed the fraud claim of Continen-
tal against Soter's, Inc. and the conspiracy to defraud claim of 
Continental against Soter's, Inc. and Tri-K. Also on stipulation, 
the Court dismissed the direct claims of Continental against United 
Pacific Insurance Company ("United Pacific") on its Performance 
APPENDIX A 
Bond issued to Tri-K and Deseret Federal Savings and Loan Associa-
tion ("Deseret Federal") as joint-obligees and against Tri-K for 
breach of its Construction Contract with Soter's, Inc. 
The Court further ruled that no party had presented evidence 
justifying an award of punitive damages and that that issue would 
not, therefore, be submitted to the jury. The Court also took from 
the jury the issue of whether Deseret Federal had properly charged 
two draw requests against a Revolving Line of Credit given by 
Deseret Federal to Summit Park Co. ("Summit Park") finding that the 
payment of the draw requests out of the Revolving Line of Credit 
had not been authorized. The Court further found, however, that 
said payments were properly chargeable to the Promissory Note and 
Construction Loan Agreement between Deseret Federal and Soter's, 
Inc. Finally, the Court ruled that the mechanicfs lien claim of 
Tri-K against the condominium property presented equitable issues 
and that the Court would hear argument on that claim after the 
remaining issues in the case had been submitted to the jury. Upon 
further hearing, the Court ruled that Tri-K was not entitled to a 
mechanic's lien. 
The remaining factual issues were submitted to the jury under 
52 special interrogatories on May 25, 1988. The jury returned its 
answers to those interrogatories on May 26, 1988. The Court heard 
further oral argument of counsel on June 27, 1988, July 15, 1988, 
and September 21, 1988, on various motions of the parties for entry 
of judgment based upon answers of the jury to certain special 
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interrogatories or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on 
certain other answers of the jury. All parties agree that after 
the jury rendered its verdict, the parties made various motions, 
including motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The 
Court having now considered the jury's answers to the special 
interrogatories, the evidence introduced at the time of trial and 
the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, 
enters its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment as 
follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
I. 
Pursuant to the Pre-Trial Order stipulated to by all parties 
and submitted to this Court, certain uncontested facts underlying 
the matters at issue in this case were stipulated and agreed to by 
all the parties. The Court does hereby adopt those stipulated and 
agreed facts as a portion of its Findings of Fact as follows: 
1. Soter's, Inc. is a Utah corporation and is the fee owner 
of the land on which the condominium project which is the subject 
of this lawsuit was partially constructed. 
2. Summit Park is a Utah corporation and is the fee owner 
of the 350 acre undeveloped parcel. 
3. Gregory S. Soter and Julie Soter are all individuals and 
residents of the State of Utah. 
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4. Deseret Federal is a federally chartered savings and loan 
association with its principal place of business located in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
5. Continental formerly did business as Continental Federal 
Savings and Loan Association and is a federally chartered savings 
bank with its principal place of business located in the State of 
Virginia. 
6. Sherwin Knudsen is an individual and resident of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, and does business as Tri-K. Tri-K was 
the general contractor for the construction of the condominium 
project which is at issue in this case. 
7. United Pacific is a corporation organized under the laws 
of the State of Washington and is authorized to do business in the 
State of Utah. 
8. On April 4, 1984, Soter's, Inc. and Deseret Federal 
executed a Construction Loan Agreement. 
9. In connection with the Construction Loan Agreement, 
Soter's, Inc. executed a Promissory Note dated April 4, 1984, in 
the face amount of $3,000,000.00. 
10. As security for the Construction Loan Agreement and 
Promissory Note, Soter's, Inc. executed a Construction Deed of 
Trust, Security Agreement, and Assignment of Rents dated April 4, 
1984, with respect to the condominium project property. 
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11. In addition to the Deed of Trust, Soter's, Inc. also 
executed certain UCC-1 financing statements dated April 23, and 
April 25, 1984. 
12. Gregory S. Soter, and Julie Soter each executed a 
guarantee dated April 4, 1984, guaranteeing the performance of the 
Promissory Note by Soter1s, Inc. 
13. Summit Park executed that certain Deed of Trust, Security 
Agreement, and Assignment of Rents dated April 4, 1984, as 
additional security for the Construction Loan Agreement and 
Promissory Note. This Deed of Trust covered the 350 acre parcel. 
14. Summit Park also executed certain UCC-1 financing 
statements dated April 23, 1984 and April 25, 1984 which pertained 
to the 3 50 acre parcel. 
15. Deseret Federal and Summit Park executed a Revolving Line 
of Credit Agreement dated April 4, 1984, in the amount of 
$350,000.00. 
16. In connection with the Revolving Line of Credit Agree-
ment, Summit Park executed a Secured Revolving Promissory Note 
dated April 4, 1984, in the principal amount of $350,000.00. 
17. As security for the obligations under the Revolving Line 
of Credit Agreement, Summit Park executed a Deed of Trust, Security 
Agreement, and Assignment of Rents dated April 4, 1984, covering 
the 350 acres. 
18. As further security for the obligations under the 
Revolving Line of Credit Agreement, Soter1s, Inc. executed a Deed 
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of Trust, Security Agreement, and Assignment of Rents dated April 
4, 1984, covering the condominium property. 
19. With regard to the Revolving Line of Credit Agreement, 
Summit Park and Soter's, Inc. also executed certain UCC-1 Financing 
Statements pertaining to the condominium property and the 350 acre 
parcel. 
20. Gregory S. Soter and Julie Soter also each executed a 
guarantee dated April 4, 1984, for the purpose of guaranteeing the 
performance by Summit Park of the Revolving Line of Credit 
Agreement. 
21. The Construction Loan Agreement and Promissory Note 
between Soter1s, Inc. and Deseret Federal were preceded by an 
earlier construction loan agreement and promissory note between 
Soter's, Inc. and Zion's First National Bank ("Zions"). 
22. The disbursements under the Construction Loan Agreement 
and Promissory Note between Soter's, Inc. and Deseret Federal were 

































































In addition to the above-listed disbursements, Deseret Federal 
made other disbursements and interest charges related to the loans 
and the Camelot Condominium Project. 
23. The disbursements under the Revolving Line of Credit 
Agreement and Promissory Note between Summit Park Company and 
Deseret Federal were made as follows: 
Date Amount Payee Purpose 
05/01/84 $ 2,500.00 Chapman & Cutler Attorneys1 Fees 
06/26/84 901.00 Associated Title Title Insurance 
12/18/84 67,769.28 Tri-K Draw Request 
02/07/84 72,256.50 Tri-K Draw Request 
In addition to the above listed disbursements, interest 
charges were made to the Revolving Line of Credit. 
24. By letter, dated March 5, 1984, Continental committed to 
participate with Deseret Federal in funding the construction loan 
for the Camelot Condominiums, subject to the terms and conditions 
outlined in said commitment letter. Except as this commitment 
letter may be so construed, no formal written participation 
agreement was ever executed between Deseret Federal and Continen-
tal. As evidence of the participation of Continental, Deseret 
Federal on August 22, 1984, endorsed the Promissory Note to 
Continental. Thereafter, Continental reimbursed Deseret Federal 
for a portion of the loan funds which had been disbursed in the 
amount of $1,705,767.17. 
25. Under date of April 4, 1984, United Pacific issued its 
Performance Bond insuring the performance of the general contrac-
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tor, Tri-K. Soter's, Inc. and Deseret Federal were named as joint 
obligees. 
26. On April 4, 1984, Deseret Federal, by a letter addressed 
to the Dale Barton Agency, who was an agent for the United Pacific, 
stated, in part, "This letter will confirm that Deseret Federal 
Savings and Loan Association of Salt Lake City, Utah, will escrow 
funds into a construction account in the amount of $2,801,850.00 
for the construction of the Camelot Condominium located at Summit 
Park, Utah pursuant to the construction loan agreement." 
27. Under date of April 4, 1984, United Pacific also issued 
its Payment and Materials Bond with Soter's, Inc. and Deseret 
Federal again being named as joint obligees. 
28. Tri-K submitted monthly draw requests for payment of 
labor and materials purchased for the construction of the Camelot 
Condominiums. Tri-K submitted its draw requests directly to 
Deseret Federal and was paid the amount requested on each draw 
request submitted directly to Deseret Federal, except for the draw 
requests submitted for materials and labor provided for the project 
in the months of January, February, March, and April 1985. 
29. On or about April 2, 1985, Deseret Federal prepared an 
"Extension Agreement" which was accepted by Soterfs, Inc. and was 
approved by the Loan Committee of Deseret Federal and pursuant to 
which the due date of the first payment under the note and deed of 
trust payable by Soterfs, Inc. was extended from April 5, 1985, 
until October 5, 1985. 
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30. Except as the questions of validity and enforceability 
may be reserved in the contested issues of fact, there is no 
dispute that the above referenced Notes, Deeds of Trust, Agreements 
and Bonds were executed by those having authority for and in behalf 
of the parties thereto. 
II. 
At the conclusion of trial and before submission to the jury 
of the contested issues of fact on special interrogatory, the Court 
ruled on the parties1 motions for directed verdict. Based upon 
such rulings the Court enters the following additional Findings of 
Fact: 
31. Continental was not a party to the Construction Loan 
Agreement or the Promissory Note and at no time did Continental 
agree to directly fund the Construction Loan or Promissory Note or 
make payments directly to Soter's, Inc. or Tri-K. 
32. The Construction Loan Agreement expressly provided that 
Deseret Federal was obligated to fund the subject loan regardless 
of whether it obtained funds from a participant provided that 
Soter's, Inc. was not in default and had complied with all 
conditions precedent for each advance. Section 8(f) of the 
Construction Loan Agreement provides: 
Lender*s obligation to make each advance 
of the Loan, including the first advance, shall 
also be subject to the satisfaction of the 
following conditions: 
(f) Lender shall have received from the 
Participant an amount equal to 95% of the 
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requested advance; provided however, if Bor-
rower is not in default, has timely complied 
with all of the conditions precedent to an 
advance, and Lender has not received the 
aforesaid amount from Participant within 10 
days after the date of requested disbursement 
then Lender shall waive the requirement that 
it receive such amount prior to the disburse-
ment of such advance. 
33. Continental at no time made any payments directly to 
Soter's, Inc. or Tri-K. 
34. The $1,705,767.17 funded by Continental was paid directly 
to Deseret Federal to reimburse Deseret Federal for disbursements 
it had already made under the loan. 
35. Deseret Federal was the only intended beneficiary of the 
agreement of Continental to participate in the Construction Loan. 
36. In endorsing the Promissory Note to Continental on August 
22, 1984, Deseret Federal intended only to assign to Continental 
Deseret Federal's rights under the Promissory Note to collect the 
amounts due and owing as security for repayment of the funds 
advanced by Continental and also to secure any funds advanced by 
Deseret Federal. Deseret Federal did not intend and, in fact, did 
not assign to Continental its obligations under the Promissory Note 
or Construction Loan Agreement. 
37. As a consequence of such endorsement, Continental became 
a holder of the Promissory Note. 
38. Continental took endorsement of the Promissory Note from 
Deseret Federal for value and in good faith. 
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39. At the time the Promissory Note was endorsed by Deseret 
Federal to Continental it was not overdue and had not been dis-
honored, 
40. Deseret Federal was never expressly authorized to act as 
the agent of Continental and Deseret Federal never represented 
itself to be the agent of Continental nor did it undertake to act 
or speak for Continental as its agent. 
41. Deseret Federal was not authorized in writing by Summit 
Park to make the December 18, 1984 disbursement in the amount of 
$67,769.28 paid to Tri-K for Draw Request No. 7, dated December 4, 
1984, or the February 7, 1985 disbursement in the amount of 
$72,256.50 paid to Tri-K for Draw Request No. 8, dated January 11, 
1988, out of the Revolving Line of Credit. Those funds were used, 
however, to pay Draw Requests of Tri-K for work completed prior to 
December 31, 1984. 
42. Tri-K provided labor and materials to the Camelot 
Condominium Project from August 1983 through April 1985. 
III. 
The disputed issues of fact remaining were then submitted to 
the jury on special interrogatory. In accordance with the jury 
answers to those special interrogatories, the Court does hereby 
enter the additional following Findings of Fact: 
43. The jury found in answer to Special Interrogatory 1 that 
as of January 19, 1985 and beyond the $3,000,000.00 Construction 
Loan was in balance because the undisbursed portion of the Con-
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struction Loan equaled or exceeded the estimated costs of complet-
inq the Camelot Condominium Project. 
44. In answer to Special Interroqatory 5, the jury found that 
as of January 1985, the Camelot Condominium Project could not have 
been completed on or before April 4, 1985 as required by the 
Construction Loan Aqreement. 
45. In answer to Special Interroqatories 6, 7, and 8, the 
jury found that all of the elements of waiver by Deseret Federal 
of the April 4, 1985 completion date had been established and that 
Deseret Federal had waived such completion date. 
46. In answer to Special Interroqatory 9, the jury found that 
the amount of $1,250,000.00 would fairly compensate Soter's, Inc. 
for the loss proximately caused by Deseret Federal's decision to 
stop further fundinq of the loan. The Court modifies such findinq 
made by the jury, however, insofar as the jury attempted to award 
interest calculated on a basis which was not leqally justifiable. 
The answer to Special Interroqatory 9 is, accordinqly, amended by 
the Court to provide for interest on the $1,250,000.00 at the leqal 
rate from and after the date of judqment entered herein. 
47. In answer to Special Interrogatory 10, the jury found 
that Sote^s, Inc. had breached the terms of the Promissory Note 
and Construction Loan Aqreement in that the Camelot Condominium 
Project was not completed on or before April 4, 1985; Soter's, Inc. 
abandoned work on the Camelot Condominium Project and construction 
ceased for 21 consecutive days; Soter's, Inc. permitted mechanic's 
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liens to be filed against the Camelot Condominium Project; &nd 
Soter's, Inc. failed to pay principal and interest on or before 
October 5# 1985, the date to which repayment had been extended. 
48. In answer to Special Interrogatory 11, the jury found 
that Soter's, Inc. was indebted to Deseret Federal and Continental 
under the Construction Loan and Promissory Note in the amount of 
the principal advanced and the interest accrued. The evidence 
reflected that the principal balance due under the Promissory Note 
is $2,700,485.75 and the Court does also further find that the 
interest accrued on that principal through October 31, 1988 is 
$1,268,941.28. 
49. In answer to Special Interrogatory 12, the jury found 
that as of August 22, 1984, when the Promissory Note was endorsed 
to Continental by Deseret Federal, Continental did not have notice 
that Soter's, Inc. could claim that Deseret Federal had waived the 
requirement that the undisbursed portion of the Construction Loan 
equaled or exceeded the estimated costs of completing the Camelot 
Condominiums. 
50. In answer to Special Interrogatories 13, 14, and 15, the 
jury found that all of the elements of waiver had not been 
established to demonstrate that Continental had acted in such a 
manner as to waive its right as the holder of the Promissory Note 
to require Soter's, Inc. to complete the Camelot Condominium 
Project by April 4, 1985, pursuant to the Construction Loan 
Agreement. 
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51. In answer to Special Interrogatories 16, 17
 # and 18, the 
jury found that the Construction Contract entered into by and 
between Tri-K and Soterfs, Inc. was that certain contract providing 
for a lump sum amount of $2#801,850.00 with a completion date of 
December 31, 1984. 
52. In answer to Special Interrogatory 19, the jury found 
that Tri-K did not substantially complete the construction of the 
Camelot Condominium Project on or before December 31, 1984. 
53. In answer to Special Interrogatories 20 and 21, the jury 
found that Tri-K withdrew all or a portion of its profits from Draw 
Requests paid by Deseret Federal and that the dollar profit 
improperly withdrawn by Tri-K through said Draw Requests was 
$202,651.74. The Court finds that such withdrawal of profit was 
unauthorized because Tri-K had not completed the Camelot Con-
dominium Project, as was required before Tri-K was entitled to any 
profit. 
54. In answering Special Interrogatories 22, 23, and 24, the 
jury found that with regard to the claims of Deseret Federal 
against Tri-K all of the elements necessary to demonstrate that 
Deseret Federal had acted in such a manner to waive its right under 
the Construction Contract to have the Camelot Condominium Project 
completed on or before December 31, 1984, had not been established 
and that Deseret Federal did not, therefore, waive such right. 
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55. In answering Special Interrogatory 26, the jury found 
that United Pacific did not complete the Construction Contract or 
remedy the default of Tri-K under the Construction Contract. 
56. In response to Special Interrogatory 27, the jury found 
that the cost of completing the construction of the Camelot 
Condominium Project was $2,602,500.00. 
57. The Court further finds that with respect to the cost of 
completion United Pacific is entitled to set off against that 
amount those funds which were remaining unpaid to Tri-K. The Court 
finds that the amount of such set off is $386,581.00 calculated as 
follows: 
a. Pursuant to paragraphs 6.1 of the Construction Loan 
Agreement, Deseret Federal was obligated to fund 
$2,554,850.00 for "construction costs including pay-
off of existing indebtedness". 
b. Tri-K had received in payment for construction costs 
the amount of $1,715,269.00 which had been paid 
either directly by Deseret Federal or which Tri-K 
had received through the earlier construction loan 
from Zion's. These payments to Tri-K out of the 
Zion's loan were part of the prior existing indebt-
edness which was paid off by Deseret Federal. 
c. In addition to the payments which Tri-K had received 
out of the Zion's loan for "construction costs" 
Deseret Federal was required to expend an additional 
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$453,000.00 to pay off the existing indebtedness to 
Zion's. 
d. When the $1,715,269.00 in construction costs paid 
to Tri-K and the additional $453,000.00 in existing 
indebtedness are deducted from the $2,554,850.00 
which Deseret Federal was committed to expend on 
construction costs under the Construction Loan 
Agreement the balance payable to Tri-K for construc-
tion costs is $386,581.00. 
58. In answer to Special Interrogatories 30 through 38, the 
jury found that Deseret Federal induced Tri-K to remain on the job 
after December 31, 1984 by promising to pay Tri-K for construction 
costs incurred for the Camelot Condominium Project during January, 
February, March, and April 1985. Although the jury's findings are 
framed in terms of a fraudulent inducement, the Court finds that 
there is not competent evidence in the record to support a finding 
of actual fraud. Nevertheless, the Court does concur with the 
jury's finding that Deseret Federal did make such a promise to pay 
and failed to pay Tri-K. The Court further finds that as a 
consequence of such promise to pay Tri-K, Deseret Federal is 
estopped from denying its obligation to pay for construction costs 
incurred for the Camelot Condominium Project during January, 
February, March and April of 1985. 
59. The jury found in response to Special Interrogatory 39 
that the financial loss suffered by Tri-K as a result of such 
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promise to pay Tri-K was $419,482.58 plus interest. That figure 
is not supported by competent evidence in the record. The Court 
finds that the amount to which Tri-K is entitled is $102,796.00 
which is the net amount of the unpaid draw requests for January, 
February, March and April of 1985 after deducting amounts due to 
subcontractors and suppliers which amounts have been previously 
settled and paid. 
60. In answer to Special Interrogatory 40, the jury found 
that Deseret Federal made no misrepresentation of a presently 
existing material fact regarding the escrow of funds into a 
construction account in the amount of $2,801,850.00 for the 
construction of the Camelot Condominium Project. 
61. Special Interrogatories 48 through 50 dealt with whether 
Deseret Federal had waived the December 31, 1984 completion date 
under the Construction Contract with regard to its claim against 
United Pacific. While the answers to these interrogatories appear 
on the surface to be inconsistent with the jury's answers to 
Special Interrogatories 22 through 24, where the jury found that 
Deseret Federal had not waived the December 31, 1984 completion 
date with regard to its claim against Tri-K, Special Interrogatory 
50 misstates the third element of waiver which was correctly stated 
in Special Interrogatory 24. Interrogatory 50 essentially restates 
the first element of waiver in which the jury found under both 
Special Interrogatory 22 and Special Interrogatory 48 had been 
established. In endeavoring to reconcile these Interrogatories, 
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the Court finds that the evidence of waiver is the same for both 
Tri-K and United Pacific and further finds that if the jury had 
been given the same three elements of waiver with regard to United 
Pacific as it had been given with respect to Tri-K that the jury's 
answers would have been the same. Accordingly, the Court finds 
that Deseret Federal did not waive its right to claim against 
United Pacific that Tri-K breached its obligation to complete the 
project by December 31, 1984, 
62. In answer to Special Interrogatory 51, the jury found 
that the amount of retainage from the Draw Requests which Tri-K was 
entitled to be paid by Soter's, Inc. was $419,432.58 plus interest. 
This amount of retainage awarded by the jury to Tri-K has no basis 
in the evidence in this case and the Court declines to follow the 
juryfs answer to this interrogatory. The evidence which was 
introduced during the course of the trial was that the amount of 
retainage from the Draw Requests that had been withheld on the Tri-
K Construction Contract was $4 3,889.72, and the Court so finds. 
However, inasmuch as Tri-K failed to complete the Camelot Con-
dominium Project, and has already unauthorizedly withdrawn profit 
in the amount of $202,651.74, the Court finds that there is 
insufficient evidence which would entitle Tri-K to any retainage 
and accordingly sets aside the jury's finding on this issue. 
63. In answering Special Interrogatory 52, the jury found 
that Tri-K had established that it was entitled to receive from 
Soter's, Inc. the profit which it would have received upon comple-
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tion of the Camelot Condominium Project. Inasmuch as Tri-K failed 
to complete the Camelot Condominium Project, and has already 
unauthorizedly withdrawn profit in the amount of $202,651.74, the 
Court finds that there is insufficient evidence which would entitle 
Tri-K to any profit and accordingly sets aside the jury's finding 
on this issue. 
64. Based upon the jury's answers to the Special 
Interrogatories and the evidence at trial, the Court finds that 
Tri-K knowingly and improperly withdrew through its Draw Requests 
profits in the amount of $202,651.74, and that Tri-K has already 
received payment for the reasonable value of all improvements 
constructed by Tri-K with respect to the Camelot Condominium 
Project. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court does now 
enter its Conclusions of Law as follows: 
1. Deseret Federal did not act as the agent of Continental 
in negotiating the Construction Loan Agreement or in funding the 
Construction Loan, and the claims of Soter's, Inc. and Tri-K 
against Continental predicated upon such alleged agency relation-
ship should be dismissed with prejudice. 
2. Deseret Federal, in inducing Tri-K to remain on the 
Camelot Condominium Project after December 31, 1984, was not acting 
in any manner as the agent of Continental, and the claims of Tri-
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K against Continental predicated upon such alleged agency should 
be dismissed with prejudice. 
3. The arrangement between Deseret Federal and Continental 
for Continental to participate in the Construction Loan was not 
intended as a third-party beneficiary contract for the benefit of 
either Soter's, Inc. or Tri-K, and the claims of Soter's, Inc. and 
Tri-K against Continental predicated upon a third-party beneficiary 
claim should be dismissed with prejudice. 
4. Continental and Deseret Federal were not partners with 
respect to the Construction Loan between Deseret Federal and 
Soter's, Inc. 
5. Deseret Federal and Continental were not joint-venturers 
with respect to the Construction Loan between Deseret Federal and 
Soter's, Inc. 
6. There is no basis in the record upon which any party can 
justify the award of punitive or exemplary damages and no punitive 
or exemplary damages should, therefore, be awarded to any party. 
7. Continental having stipulated at the close of trial that 
there was insufficient evidence of record to support its claim of 
fraud against Soter's, Inc. and its claim of conspiracy to defraud 
against Soter's, Inc. and Tri-K those claims should be dismissed 
with prejudice. 
8. The April 2, 1985 "Extension Agreement" extended only the 
date on which the first payment under the Promissory Note was due 
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and did not extend any duties or obligations of Deseret Federal to 
further fund said Note. 
9. In response to a Motion to Dismiss of United Pacific, 
Continental stipulated at the close of trial that it was not a 
joint obligee under the Performance Bond of United Pacific and that 
its interests were sufficiently protected by the claims of Deseret 
Federal against United Pacific on the Bond. Based upon such 
stipulation of Continental, Continental's direct claims against 
United Pacific should be dismissed with prejudice. 
10. In response to a Motion to Dismiss of Tri-K, Continental 
stipulated at the close of trial that it was not a party to the 
Construction Contract between Soter's, Inc. and Tri-K or the direct 
assignee of the benefits of Soter's, Inc. under that contract and 
that its interests were protected by the claims of Deseret Federal 
against Tri-K as the assignee of the rights of Soter's, Inc. under 
such contract. Based upon such stipulation, the claims of Con-
tinental against Tri-K for breach of the Construction Contract 
should be dismissed with prejudice. 
11. Deseret Federal having stipulated before trial that it 
did not wish to pursue its indemnity claim against Soter's, Inc. 
under the Assignment of Construction Contract and Consent, the 
indemnity claim against Soter's, Inc. should be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
12. Inasmuch as Deseret Federal ceased funding the Construc-
tion Loan after December 31, 1984, Soter's# Inc. is entitled to 
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have judgment in its favor and against Deseret Federal for the sum 
of $1,250,000.00, together with interest thereon at the legal rate 
from the date of the Order, Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure 
entered in this matter. Deseret Federal is entitled to offset 
Soter's, Inc.'s judgment against it by Deseret Federal's judgment 
for its portion of the principal and interest due under the 
Soter's, Inc. Promissory Note. Deseret Federal's portion of the 
principal and interest due under the Soter's, Inc. Promissory Note 
through October 31, 1988 is $1,550,529.62. 
13. Deseret Federal waived the April 4, 1985 completion date 
contained in the Construction Loan Agreement between Soter's, Inc. 
and Deseret Federal. 
14. Inasmuch as Soter's, Inc. failed to submit the breach of 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to the jury, 
Deseret Federal did not breach the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing and such claim should be dismissed with prejudice. 
15. The December 18, 1984 and the February 7, 1985 disburse-
ments out of the Revolving Line of Credit are properly attributable 
to the Promissory Note and Construction Loan Agreement, and the 
amounts of such disbursements, plus interest and all other charges 
and costs relating thereto, should be added to the amount of 
principal disbursed under the Promissory Note and Construction Loan 
Agreement. Therefore, Deseret Federal did not breach the Revolving 
Line of Credit Agreement and did not convert money from Summit 
Park, and such claims should be dismissed with prejudice. 
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16. Soter's, Inc. breached the Promissory Note and Construc-
tion Loan Agreement by not completing the Camelot Condominium 
Project on or before April 4, 1985, by abandoning work on the 
Camelot Condominium Project and ceasing construction for 21 
consecutive days, by permitting mechanic's liens to be filed 
against the Camelot Condominium Project, and by failing to pay 
principal and interest on or before October 5, 1985. 
17. Inasmuch as Deseret Federal endorsed the Soter's, Inc. 
Promissory Note as secured by the Soter's Trust Deed and the Summit 
Park Trust Deed to Continental on August 22, 1984, both Continental 
and Deseret Federal have an interest in the Soter's, Inc. Promis-
sory Note. As a consequence of the interests that Continental and 
Deseret Federal each hold in the Soter's, Inc. Promissory Note as 
secured by the Soter's Trust Deed and the Summit Park Trust Deed, 
Continental and Deseret Federal may jointly foreclose the Soter's 
Trust Deed and the Summit Park Trust Deed. 
18. Continental holds the Soter's, Inc. Promissory Note under 
the endorsement by Deseret Federal as a holder in due course. 
19. The total sum of $3,969,427.03, together with interest 
continuing on the principal amount of $2,700,485.75 at the rate 
set forth in the Promissory Note from and after October 31, 1988, 
plus the attorney's fees and costs of Court incurred by Continental 
in conjunction with this case, is due under the Soter's, Inc. 
Promissory Note as secured by the Trust Deeds that are the subject 
to this action, which Trust Deeds were given by Soter's, Inc. and 
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Summit Park, as trustors, to Deseret Federal, as trustee and 
beneficiary. The Trust Deed given by Soter's, Inc. (hereinafter 
referred to as the "Soter's Trust Deed") was recorded in the office 
of the Summit County Recorder on April 23, 1984 as Entry 219486, 
in Book 297 at Page 381. The Trust Deed given by Summit Park 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Summit Park Trust Deed") was 
recorded in the office of the Summit County Recorder on April 23, 
1984 as Entry No. 219487, in Book 297 at Page 401 and rerecorded 
in the office of the Summit County Recorder on May 3, 1984 as Entry 
No. 219995, in Book 298 at Page 626. The entire amount of the 
Soter's, Inc. Promissory Note is presently due. 
20. Soter's, Inc. is entitled to offset its judgment in the 
amount of $1,2 50,000.00 against the amount due on the Soter's, Inc. 
Promissory Note. Such offset, however, is limited to the principal 
advanced by Deseret Federal, together with accrued interest on that 
principal. 
21. The Soter's Trust Deed and the Summit Park Trust Deed, 
which cover the real property described in Exhibits "A" and "B" 
attached hereto, are valid and subsisting liens upon said real 
property securing the indebtedness identified above, and the 
interests of all parties in said real property are inferior and 
subordinate to the liens of the Soter's Trust Deed and the Summit 
Park Trust Deed. 
22. Continental and Deseret Federal have duly elected to seek 
foreclosure of the Soter's Trust Deed and the Summit Park Trust 
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Deed in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages 
upon real property, and are entitled to a judgment and decree of 
foreclosure• 
23. The interests, if any, in the parcels of real property 
described in Exhibits "Alf and "Bw hereto of all parties herein, 
except Continental and Deseret Federal, all those claiming by, 
through or under any parties herein except Continental and Deseret 
Federal, and all persons whose interest in said property was not 
duly recorded in the proper office at the time of recording of the 
Soterfs Trust Deed and the Summit Park Trust Deed be and the same 
are hereby barred and foreclosed, subject to their statutory rights 
of redemption, if any. 
24. In the event that the proceeds of the sale of the parcels 
of real property described in Exhibits "A1 and MB,f hereto, which 
are covered by the Soter's Trust Deed and the Summit Park Trust 
Deed, are insufficient to satisfy the indebtedness set forth in 
paragraph 19 hereof, Continental and Deseret Federal will be 
entitled to have and recover judgment against Soter's and Summit 
Park, jointly and severally, in such amount. 
25. Inasmuch as Gregory S. Soter and Julie Soter executed 
unconditional guarantees, guaranteeing the performance of the 
Promissory Note by Soterfs, Inc., Continental and Deseret Federal 
are entitled to have and recover judgment in their favor and 
against Gregory S. Soter and Julie Soter, jointly and severally, 
in the amount of indebtedness set forth in paragraph 19 hereof. 
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26. Tri-K is not entitled to any mechanicfs lien upon the 
subject property, and Tri-K's claim to establish and foreclose its 
mechanic's lien should be dismissed with prejudice. 
27. United Pacific and Tri-K had the obligation and duty to 
construct and complete the Camelot Condominium Project. As between 
Deseret Federal and Soter's, Inc., on the one hand, and United 
Pacific and Tri-K, on the other hand, Deseret Federal and Soter's, 
Inc. had no obligation or duty to complete the construction to 
mitigate their damages caused by United Pacific's and Tri-K's 
failure to construct and complete the Camelot Condominium Project. 
28. Tri-K breached its Construction Contract, which had been 
assigned to Deseret Federal, by failing to complete construction 
of the Camelot Condominium Project on or before December 31, 1984, 
and by unauthorizedly withdrawing profits in the amount of 
$202,651.74. 
29. United Pacific breached its Performance Bond by failing 
to complete the Construction Contract and by failing to remedy Tri-
Kfs breaches of the Construction Contract. 
30. Deseret Federal and Soter's, Inc. did not waive the 
December 31, 1984 completion date found in the Construction 
Contract. 
31. As a result of United Pacific's and Tri-K's breaches, 
Deseret Federal has been damaged, and is entitled to a judgment 
against United Pacific and Tri-K, jointly and severally, in the 
amount of $2,215,919.00. 
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32. Inasmuch as Deseret Federal promised to pay Tri-K for 
construction costs incurred for the Camelot Condominium Project 
during January, February, March, and April 1985 and failed to make 
such payments, Deseret Federal breached such promise and is 
estopped from denying its obligation to make such payment. Tri-K 
is entitled to a judgment against Deseret Federal in the amount of 
$102,796.00. 
33. Deseret Federal did not defraud Tri-K and Tri-K1s fraud 
claim against Deseret Federal should be dismissed with prejudice. 
34. Deseret Federal did not defraud United Pacific and United 
Pacific's fraud claim against Deseret Federal should be dismissed 
with prejudice. 
DATED this /£ day of ^S£SLS^C^> 1989. 
JY THE COURT: 
fH'E Wl<ORAlBLB-ER^EST F 
I^ t s t r i c t Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law postage prepaid 
this cffi^ciay of November, 1988, to the following: 
Herschel J. Saperstein, Esq. 
Glen E. Davies, Esq. 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Robert W. Hughes, Esq. 
HUGHES & McPHEE 
50 West Broadway, Tenth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Lowell V. Summerhays, Esq. 
8391 Viscounti 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
William J. Cayias, Esq. 
1558 South 1100 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SOTER'S INC., et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS AND j 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al., 
Defendants, 
SHERWIN KNUDSEN d/b/a ] 
TRI-K GENERAL CONTRACTORS, 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. 
SOTER'S, INC., et al. ] 
Defendants. ] 
| ORDER, JUDGMENT, AND 
| DECREE OF FORECLOSURE 
I Civil No. 8560 
I (Judge Ernest Baldwin) 
i Case No. 8561 
(Consolidated) 
This matter came on regularly for trial before the Court on 
May 11, 1988 until May 26, 1988, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin 
presiding. Soter*s, Inc. was represented by Lowell V. Summerhays; 
Summit Park Company ("Summit Park"), Gregory S. Soter, and Julie 
Soter were represented by William J. Cayias; Deseret Federal 
Savings and Loan Association ("Deseret Federal") was represented 
by Stephen G. Crockett and Gregory D. Phillips of and for the firm 
of Kimball, Parr, Crockett and Waddoups; Continental Federal 
Savings Bank ("Continental") was represented by Glen E. Davies of 
and for the firm of Watkiss & Campbell; Sherwin Knudsen dba Tri-K 
APPENDIX B 
Construction Co. ("Tri-K") was represented by William R. Russell; 
and United Pacific Insurance Co. ("United Pacific") was represented 
by Robert W. Hughes. The Court having reviewed the Interrogatories 
to the Jury, having reviewed the file herein, having heard the 
arguments of counsel at hearings on June 27, 1988, July 15, 1988, 
and September 21, 1988, including the parties' motions for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, and being now fully advised in the 
premises, by virtue of the law, and good cause appearing therefor, 
HEREBY ENTERS IT'S JUDGMENT AND DECREES as follows: 
1. That the total sum of $3,969,427.03, together with 
interest on the principal amount of $2,700,485.75 at the rate set 
forth in the Soter's, Inc. Promissory Note from and after October 
31, 1988, plus Continental's attorney's fees and costs in the 
amount of $ , is due under the Soter's, Inc. 
Promissory Note, and secured by the Trust Deeds that are the 
subject of this action which Trust Deeds were given by Soter's, 
Inc. and Summit Park, Utah Corporations, as trustors, to Deseret 
Federal as trustee and beneficiary. The Trust Deed given by 
Soter's, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the "Soter's Trust Deed") 
was recorded in the office of the Summit County Recorder on April 
23, 1984 as Entry 219486, in Book 297 at Page 381. The Trust Deed 
given by Summit Park (hereinafter referred to as the "Summit Park 
Trust Deed") was recorded in the office of the Summit County 
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Recorder on April 23, 1984 as Entry No. 219487, in Book 297 at Page 
401 and rerecorded in the office of the Summit County Recorder on 
May 3, 1984 as Entry No. 219995, in Book 298 at Page 626. The 
entire amount thereof is presently due, and there exist no offsets 
or defenses as would reduce said amount, except that Soter's, Inc. 
may offset Deseret Federal's share of Deseret Federal's principal 
and interest due under the Promissory Note by $1,250,000.00, 
together with interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of 
this Order, Judgment, and Decree of Foreclosure. Deseret Federal's 
portion of the principal and interest due under the Soter's, Inc. 
Promissory Note through October 31, 1988 is $1,550,529.62. 
2. That it is adjudged and decreed that the Soter's Trust 
Deed and the Summit Park Trust Deed, which cover the real property 
described in Exhibits "A" and "B" attached hereto, are valid and 
subsisting liens upon said real property securing the indebtedness 
identified in paragraph 1 hereof, and that the interests of all 
other parties in said real property are inferior and subordinate 
to the liens of the Soter's Trust Deed and the Summit Park Trust 
Deed. 
3. That Continental and Deseret Federal have judgment for 
foreclosure on the Trust Deeds that are the subject of this action, 
which Trust Deeds were given by Soter's, Inc. and Summit Park, and 
that the parcels of real property described in Exhibits "A" and "B" 
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hereto, which are covered by the Soter's Trust Deed and the Summit 
Park Trust Deed, shall be sold to satisfy the indebtedness adjudged 
in paragraph 1 hereof, together with accruing interest, and the 
Sheriff of Summit County shall proceed to sell the same according 
to the provisions of law relating to sales on execution. When the 
Sheriff of Summit County sells the parcels of real property 
described in Exhibits "A" and "B,,f he shall out of the proceeds of 
such sale first retain his costs, disbursements and commissions, 
and then pay to Continental and Deseret Federal, or to their 
attorneys, the accrued and accruing costs of this action, then said 
sums for Continental's attorney's fees, then the amount owing to 
Continental and Deseret Federal for principal, interest, costs and 
expenses, taxes, assessments and insurance premiums, together with 
accrued interest thereon, or so much of said sums as said proceeds 
will pay, and that the surplus, if any, shall be accounted for and 
paid over to the Clerk of this Court subject to this Court's 
further order. 
4. That the interests, if any, in the parcels of real 
property described in Exhibits wA,f and MBM hereto of all parties 
herein except Continental and Deseret Federal, and all of those 
claiming by, through or under any parties herein except Continental 
and Deseret Federal, and all persons whose interest in said 
property was not duly recorded in the proper office at the time of 
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recording of the Soters Trust Deed and the Summit Park Trust Deed, 
be and the same are hereby barred and foreclosed, subject to their 
statutory rights of redemption, if any. 
5. That in the event that the proceeds of the sale of the 
parcels of real property described in Exhibits "A" and ,fB" hereto, 
which are covered by the Soter1s Trust Deed and the Summit Park 
Trust Deed, are insufficient to satisfy the indebtedness, 
attorneys1 fees, and other costs and expenses adjudged herein, 
Continental and Deseret Federal are entitled to have and recover 
judgment against Soter1s and Summit Park, jointly and severally, 
in such amount necessary to satisfy the indebtedness. 
6. That Continental and Deseret Federal have judgment in 
their favor and against Gregory S. Soter and Julie Soter, jointly 
and severally, in the amount of indebtedness adjudged in paragraph 
1 hereof subject to offset set forth in paragraph 1. 
7. That Deseret Federal have judgment in its favor and 
against United Pacific and Tri-K, jointly and severally, in the 
amount of $2,215,919.00, together with interest thereon at the 
legal rate from the date of this Order, Judgment, and Decree of 
Foreclosure. 
8. That Tri-K have judgment in its favor and against Deseret 
Federal in the amount of $102,796.00 plus interest thereon at the 
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legal rate from the date of this Order, Judgment, and Decree of 
Foreclosure. 
9. All claims asserted herein by Tri-K to any lien or right 
to lien upon the property described on Exhibit f,A" and/or "B" 
hereto and all claims to any lien evidenced by that certain claim 
and Notice of Lien executed by Tri-K and recorded in the office of 
the Summit County Recorder on April 25, 1985 in Book 339 at Page 
452 be and the same are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
10. Soter's, Inc.'s and Tri-K's claims against Continental 
predicated upon the alleged agency relationship that Deseret 
Federal acted as the agent of Continental in negotiating the 
Construction Loan Agreement or in funding the Construction Loan are 
hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
11. Tri-K's claims against Continental predicated upon the 
alleged agency relationship that Deseret Federal acted as the agent 
of Continental in inducing Tri-K to remain on the Camelot 
Condominium Project after December 31, 1984 are hereby dismissed 
with prejudice. 
X2. Soterfs, Inc's and Tri-K's third-party beneficiary 
contract claims against Continental are hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
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13. Continental's fraud claim against Soter's, Inc. and 
conspiracy to defraud claims against Soter's, Inc. and Tri-K are 
hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
14. Continental's Performance Bond claims against United 
Pacific are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
15. Continental's claims against Tri-K for breach of the 
Construction Contract are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
16. Deseret Federal's indemnity claim against Soter's, Inc. 
under the Assignment of Construction Contract and Consent are 
hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
17. Soter's, Inc.'s claims for breach of implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing against Deseret Federal are hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. 
18. Summit Park's claims that Deseret Federal breached the 
Revolving Line of Credit Agreement and converted money from Summit 
Park are dismissed with prejudice. 
19. Tri-K's fraud claims against Deseret Federal are 
dismissed with prejudice. 
20. United Pacific's fraud claims against Deseret Federal are 
dismissed with prejudice. 
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JUDGMENT ENTERED this 
District Judg 
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